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Valentine et al.: How Can Psychological Science Enhance the Effectiveness of Identi

Recent expernents have std ed and compared eyewitness
identification procedures including thc use of moving video
versus photographs, culprit-absent lineups versus culpritpresent lineups, and foil selection by culprit description
versus selection by suspect resemblance.

How can psychological science enhance
the effectiveness of identification
procedures?
An international comparison.
Tim Valentine, Stephen Darling and Amina
Memon'
The sequential double-blind method protects
the guilty, moving video images protect the
innocent (a little), but foil selection strategy

makes no difference.
The reliability of eyewitness identification has
attracted concern from the legal profession in England
for at least 100 years. In 1904 a committee of enquiry
was established to investigate the trials ofAdolf Beck.
Incredibly, on two separate occasions Adolf Beck was
wrongly convicted on the basis of mistaken eyewitness
identification. In both trials, multiple eyewitnesses
identified Beck as a confidence trickster who stole
jewellery from them. The crimes were subsequently
found to have been committed by William Wyatt. The
1904 Committee of enquiry led directly to the
establishment of a Court ofAppeal 2

Devlin report led directly to a landmark judgement in
the English Court of Appeal, which established a
requirement thatin cases ofdisputed identification the
trial judge must caution the jury about the dangers of
eyewitness identification evidence. The judge should
point out that confident eyewitnesses may be mistaken
and instruct the jury to consider carefully the
circumstances of the identification.4
From this historical perspective, it is unsurprising
to learn that mistaken eyewitness identification is also
a major problem for the United States courts.
Nevertheless, the extent of the problem has proved to
be greater than many may have anticipated. The work
of the U.S. Innocence Project, which to date has led

to 183 prisoners being exonerated by new DNA
evidence, found that mistaken eyewitness identification
was a factor contributing to three-quarters ofthe original
wrongful convictions.'
Recent developments to eyewitness identification
procedures
Eyewitness identification procedures used in the
United States and the United Kingdom have some
important differences. In the United States, live lineups
and identification from arrays ofphotographs are both
frequently used to collect formal eyewitness
identification. Traditionally, in the United Kingdom all
formal eyewitness identification evidence has been
obtained from live lineups. Identification from arrays
of photographs has never been permitted as a formal
means of identification. Over the last few years video
has replaced almost all live lineups. This innovation
has been made possible by development of
sophisticated computer systems used to compile video
lineups from a standardised database of moving video
clips.
Recently identification procedures in the United
States have been the subject of consultation with
eyewitness researchers. Identification from arrays of
photographs is still widely used, but the U.S. National
Institute of Justice set up a Technical Working Party
for Eyewitness Evidence to review procedure and
produced a guide to best practice.

Concern about further wrongful convictions based
on mistaken identification led to a government enquiry
into the reliability ofeyewitness identification evidence,

(Valentine, continued on page 22)

chaired by Lord Devlin, which reported in 1976.1 The
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Recent developments to identification
procedures in the USA
The U. S. National Institute of Justice document
Eyewitness identification:A guidefor law
enforcement ("the Guide")6 includes the following
guidance:
* The foils in a lineup should be selected to
generally match the witness' description
of the culprit.
* There should be a minimum of five foils.
* The witness should be advised that the
culprit may or may not be in the lineup.
* The witness should state in their own
words how confident they are of any
identification.
Two methods of lineup presentation are endorsed
by the Guide: 1) a simultaneous lineup, in which the
witness is permitted to inspect all of the photographs
or lineup members before making an identification and
2) a sequentiallineup, in which the witness sees one
photograph or person at a time and makes a decision
prior to viewing any other photograph or person. The
guide does not express any preference for one method
over the other. The procedures mentioned here do
not form an exhaustive list ofthe provisions in the Guide.
It should be noted that the guidance is a
recommendation of best practice and has no direct
legal force.
In an earlier 'white paper,' written under the
auspices of the American Psychology - Law Society
("AP-LS"), psychologists had advocated that the
person who administers a lineup should not know
which person in the lineup is the police suspect. That
is to say that the administrator should be 'blind' to the
identity of the suspect. This procedure is known as
'double-blind' as neither the administrator nor the
witness has prior knowledge of who the suspect is in
the lineup. This measure was strongly advocated by
researchers because it removes all possibility of the
witness being influenced by the lineup administrator.
Such influence can be very subtle and may occur
without any intention or awareness of either the
administrator or the witness. The double-blind
procedure is well established as an important aspect
of scientific enquiry. For example, neither the patient

Summer 2006
2006
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/8

nor the clinical staff should know which patients
received a placebo in a drug trial. A recommendation
of the double-blind method is conspicuously absent
from recommended best practice in the Guide on
eyewitness identification.
Research based on identification from photograph
arrays suggests that mistaken identification can be
reduced by sequential presentation ofthe photographs
as outlined in the Guide.9 However, the Guide did not
include the important stipulation of a 'sequential
double-blind method.' Under sequential presentation
instructions the witness should make a decision after
viewing each photograph as to whether he or she is
the culprit. If the witness rejects the photograph they
are shown the next photograph. The procedure stops
when the witness makes an identification. The method
endorsed by researchers crucially stipulates that the
witness should not know how many photographs are
in the lineup, the witness is given unbiased instructions
(e.g., that the person they saw may or may not be in
the lineup) and, importantly, that the administrator is
blind to the identity of the suspect.1 0

Video identification has a number of

important benefits [including]. . . dramatically reduc[ing] the delay before an
identification can be organized, . . . usu-

ally produc[ing] a video lineup within two
hours of request,

...

[has] a large data-

base of video clips from which to select
foils, . . . and [employs] a laptop which
can be taken to a witness who is unable
to attend the police station.

Sequential presentation is believed to reduce
mistaken identification by reducing the opportunity for
the witness to make a relative judgement. In the
traditional simultaneous presentation, a witness who
believes that the culprit is in the lineup may identify the
person who most looks like the person they saw,
having had the opportunity to view all the photographs
in an array. Sequential presentation aims to prevent
relative judgements by forcing the witness to make
(Valentine, continued on page 23)
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independent judgements to each lineup member.
Sequential presentation has been adopted in some
jurisdictions in the United States. However, in some
cases the strict procedure advocated by researchers
has not been followed in all of its aspects. It is worth
noting that researchers did not include sequential
presentation amongst the recommendations ofthe APLS white paper."
Recent developments to identification
procedures in England & Wales
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984
("PACE") which applies in England and Wales (but
not in Scotland or Northern Ireland), includes a code
of practice for identification by eyewitnesses ("code
D"). The code can be revised without the need for
new primary legislation. In recent years the code has
been revised on an annual basis. The current code of
practice (2005)12 includes the following provisions:
* A lineup that includes one suspect must
consist of at least eight foils.
* The foils must resemble the suspect in age,
general appearance and position in life.
* The suspect has the right for their legal
representative to be present during the
identification procedure.
* The person who administers the lineup
cannot be involved in the investigation of
the case (but note that the administrator
does know who the suspect is).
* Witnesses must be advised that the person
they saw may or may not be present.
* Witnesses must be advised that if they
cannot make a positive identification they
should say so.
* Witnesses must view each member of the
lineup twice before making any
identification.
* Video identification should be used unless
there is a reason why a live identification
is more appropriate.
Although the code of practice does not have
statutory force, trial judges have the discretion to
exclude or allow eyewitness identification evidence.

Therefore police forces have systems in place to
demonstrate compliance with the code.
Two different IT systems are in widespread use in
British police forces to provide video identification.
VIPERTM (Video Identification Procedure Electronic
Recording) and PROMAF" (Profile Matching)." The
systems produce similar formats of video lineup, but
each has its own database of images. Lineups consist
of 15 second clips of each person shown one after
another. The sequence starts with a head and shoulders
shot of the person looking directly at the camera, who
slowly turns their head to present a full right profile to
the camera. The person then slowly rotates their head
to present a full left profile to the camera. Finally the
person returns to looking directly into the camera in a
full-face pose.
Research on video identification
Research has demonstrated that VIPER video
lineups from real criminal cases were fairer to the
suspects than conventional 'live' lineups,14 and that
VIPER video lineups were equally fair to white
European and African-Caribbean suspects.I In these
studies, participants (known as 'mock witnesses') were
shown a set of videos of VIPER lineups or a set of
photographs of live lineups held as part of the
investigation of the case. For each lineup they were
given the first description of the offender made by the
original witness. The mock witnesses were required
to choose, on the basis of the witness' description, the
lineup member who they think is most likely to be the
police suspect. Therefore, a 'mock witness' simulates
a witness who (a) has no memory of the culprit at the
time ofthe identification procedure; (b) can remember
the description they previously gave to the police and
(c) nevertheless, makes an identification from the lineup.
If the lineup is perfectly fair, and all members fit the
description, the mock witness would have no basis on
which to make their selection and would merely have
to guess who is the suspect. Therefore, if a large
number of the mock witnesses are asked to make a
selection they would select the suspect on 11 percent
of occasions (1 in 9) from each lineup, because the
lineups all contained a suspect and eight foils.

I (Valentine, continuedon page 24)
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Using this procedure 25 percent of mock witnesses
(1 in 4) chose the suspect in the live lineups, more
than expected by chance (25 percent vs. 11 percent).' 6
In comparison, 15 percent of mock witnesses selected
the suspect from the videos of VIPER lineups.1 7
Statistical analysis showed that the VIPER lineups
were significantly fairer than the live parades (15
percent vs. 25 percent), and the VIPER lineups were
not significantly less fair than expected by chance (15
percemt vs. 11 percent).'"
Previous data from real cases suggested that live
lineups may be less fair to ethnic minorities than to
white Europeans. Therefore, the fairness of VIPER
lineups ofAfrican-Caribbeans and ofwhite Europeans
was compared. The VIPER parades were found to
be equally fair to suspects of both ethnic groups.19
Benefits of video identifications
Video identification has a number of important
benefits compared to live lineups. First, use of video
can dramatically reduce the delay before an
identification can be organized. Live lineups have been
subject to long delays to enable a selection of
appropriate foils to be available to stand on a lineup
(typically ofone to three months).2 0 In contrast, VIPER
can usually produce a video lineup within two hours
of request. Second, approximately 50 percent of live
lineups in England and Wales were cancelled, for
example, due to failure of a bailed suspect to attend,
failure of the witness to attend or lack of suitable
volunteers. 2' Cancellations contribute to a further
increase in delay before the witness can view a lineup.
Since the introduction of video identification, the
proportion ofprocedures cancelled has fallen to around
five percent.2 2 Third, availability of a large database
of video clips from which to select foils (approxiamtely
12,000) makes lineups fairer to the suspect. Fourth,
use ofvideo is less threatening to victims, who no longer
have to attend an identification suite where their
attacker may be physically present. A further
advantage is that a laptop can be taken to a witness
who is unable to attend the police station. In a recent
high-profile case, Abigail Witchalls, a victim of an
attack who was left paralysed, was able to view a
video lineup from her hospital bed, and a suspect was
eliminated from the enquiry as a result.
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Can psychological science improve the
effectiveness of video identification?
An empirical investigation was recently conducted
in our laboratory to investigate whether the
effectiveness ofthe British video identification procedure
could be enhanced by adopting: (a) a sequential
double-blind procedure and (b) selecting foils that
match the witness description of the culprit rather than
foils who resemble the suspect. The impact of using
moving rather than still video images was also
investigated. Substantial laboratory experiments
designed to simulate a forensically relevant situation as
closely as possible are described.
Sequential double-blind presentation
Video identification naturally yields a sequential
presentation. Research based on identification from
photograph arrays suggests that sequential presentation
can reduce mistaken identifications when the witness
is required to make a decision after viewing each person
as to whether he or she is the culprit. However, the
current PACE code of practice does not allow any
advantage of sequential presentation to be realised
because it requires witnesses to view the entire lineup
twice before making any decision.23 Thus, the question
arises ofwhether video identification procedures could
be improved by allowing the sequential double-blind
instructions to be used.
We compared the outcomes of lineups when
participant witnesses viewed a video lineup conducted
under sequential double-blind instructions to the
outcomes when following the procedures currently used
by the police.2 4 Although the lineup administrator in
police lineups is not blind to the identity of the suspect,
for consistency all lineups in our experiments were
conducted double-blind. All of the lineups were
constructed under supervision of the police using the
VIPER national database of foils. A video clip of the
actors who played the role of a thief in our experiment
were recorded at VIPER-equipped police stations
under standardised conditions, following the same
procedure as used with police suspects. Approximately
200 students were recruited in small groups to take
part in a study on mood and health. During the
procedure the witnesses viewed an unexpected staged
theft of a laptop. They gave a written description of
(Valentine, continued on page 25)
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Figure 1

Figure 1: The outcome of culprit present video lineups run under the existing 'view the lineup twice' instruction and the sequential method. All lineup were administered double-blind. Statistically there were significantly more correct identifications of a guilty suspect made under the view twice instructions (p<.05).
culprit present video lineups compared to the existing
procedure (36 percent vs. 65 percent of witnesses,
see Figure 1). There were also fewer mistaken
identifications of foils from culprit absent lineups (23
percent to 10 percent), but the latter effect was not
statistically significant (Figure 2). The sequential
instructions appear to reduce the rate of choosing, and
therefore suppress correct identifications as well as
incorrect identifications.
Sequential double-blind viewing instructions are
believed to reduce the number of mistaken
identifications by making it difficult for witnesses to
make a relative judgement. In our experiment we asked
the witnesses whether they had compared the faces of
lineup members with each other or whether they had
considered each person one at a time. 93 percent of
witnesses who viewed a culprit present lineup answered
'one at a time', regardless ofthe viewing instructions
they had been given. The naturally sequential
presentation of a video lineup may make relative
judgements very difficult even under the existing
procedure. When these data for the culprit absent
lineups are considered the proportion of witnesses
identification. They could ask to see the video clips of answering 'one at a time' dropped to 80 percent under
any of the lineup members again prior to make an both lineup instructions. Thus, the presence of the
culprit influenced the strategy witnesses used but the
identification.
Under sequential double-blind instructions there sequential double-blind instructions did not.
were significantly fewer correct identifications from (Valentine, continued on page 26)
the culprit. Participants returned after approximately
seven days to view a video lineup. Half of the
participants saw a lineup that included the culprit, half
saw a lineup which included an innocent suspect. The
foils in the lineups were always the same people. The
experimenter, who could not see the faces on the video
screen, did not know whether the culprit was in the
lineup. All witnesses were advised that the person they
saw may or may not be present in the lineup, and that
if they could not make a positive identification they
should say so. Under the sequential double-blind
instructions, witnesses saw the video ofthe first lineup
member. They were asked if he was the culprit, or if
they would like to see the clip again. If the witness
identified the lineup member as the culprit the procedure
ended. If they rejected the line member they were
shown the next clip. The witness was told that once
they had proceeded to the next lineup member they
could not change their mind or go back to view a
previous image. They were not told how many people
were in the lineup. In the control condition, following
the existing code ofpractice, witnesses were instructed
to watch the entire lineup twice before making any
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Figure 2

Figure 2: The outcome of culprit absent video lineups run under the existing 'view the lineup
twice' instruction and the sequential method. All lineups were administered double-blind. There were
no statistically significant differences between the outcomes.
Recent research clearly shows that there is a the same for 15-second moving video clips and for
reduction in the number of correct identifications of static full-face images presented on a monitor for 15
offenders under sequential double-blind instructions. seconds (Figure 3). When the culprit was not in the
In 2001, a combined analysis of 23 studies reported lineup, there were significantly fewer mistaken
this effect.25 The Illinois Pilot Program, an evaluation identifications of foils from moving clips than from still

of the sequential double-blind produce in real cases
conducted by the Chicago Police, found the same
effect. 26 We have also found a reduction in correct
identifications in a laboratory study under realistic
conditions using video lineups constructed from the
police national database of foils under police
supervision. Although sequential double-blind
presentation may provide some modest protection to
innocent suspects, it did not show a reliable effect in
our laboratory.
Moving images compared with stills
As part of the same experiment we have also
investigated whether the moving images used in video
identification contribute to its success compared to
single full-face images, as frequently used in American
photograph lineups. Intuition suggests that witnesses
may be more likely to be able to identify a culprit from
a moving video sequence that allows the face to be
seen from a variety of angles. However, results from
the live staged-incident experiment using video lineups
showed that this was not the case. The rate of correct
identification from culprit present video lineups was

Summer
Summer 2006
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/8

images (Figure 4). Thus the use of moving video clips
improves the fairness of lineups without affecting the
sensitivity ofthe procedure. The same trend was found
in a subsequent experiment, but the difference in
mistaken identifications from culprit absent lineups
between moving and still images was not statistically
significant. When data was combined from an
experimental condition which was common to both
experiments, based on the existing identification
procedure (i.e. viewing all lineup members twice), the
advantage for moving images in culprit absent lineups
was still significant. In conclusion, use ofmoving images
may offer some protection to innocent suspects, but
the size of any effect is small.
Research comparing selection of foils by culprit
description and by suspect resemblance
The aim of a further experiment was to investigate
whether video identifications could be made more
reliable by using a culprit-description strategy, rather
than a suspect-resemblance strategy to select the foils."
(Valentine, continuedon page 35)
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with higher rates of filler choices. This pattern remains
constant across those lineups known to contain only a
single suspect.
We recorded a total of 257 high confidence
identifications (including all suspect structures and
relationship categories). Of these 186 were suspect
choices, 64 were no choices, and seven were filler
choices. Thus, the rate of known errors for high
confidence choices was 7/257 or 2.7 percent When
looking solely at those single-suspect lineups containing
identifications of strangers, it is of some interest to note
that there was only one known error (filler choice) out
ofa total of65 high confidence identifications regardless
oflineup type and procedure. Out of 81 high confidence
stranger identifications (for both single and multiplesuspect lineups), there was also only one filler choice.
Ifwitnesses were influenced by investigators in the
simultaneous and not the sequential/blind procedure,
then they should be more confident in their choices,
on average, in the simultaneous than the sequential
procedure. When we examined the percentage of
highly confident witnesses ("That's him. I'm certain.";
"100 percent sure."; "100 percent absolutely positive.";
"I'm positive that's the one that shot me."; "Yep, that's
him. I'm sure, 200 percent") for each lineup procedure,
78.3 percent and 77.1 percent were highly confident
in their choices and 7.8 percent and 9.8 percent
expressed low confidence ("I think that's him, but I
can't be positive.", ""He looks like the guy, but I'm
not positive.", "# could have been the passenger.",
"Only 45 percent sure.") in the simultaneous and
sequential lineup procedure, respectively. Thus,
contrary to the investigator influence explanation,
witnesses were not more confident in their choices
under the simultaneous than sequential lineup
procedure.

We can test the investigator influence explanation
even more precisely by noting that if the administrator
was leaking cues to pick the suspect (and not the fillers)
during the simultaneous lineups, only those witnesses
that picked the suspect would have the consensual
validation of the their choices. Those who picked the
fillers would actually be disagreeing with the
administrator's influence attempt. This reasoning
predicts that the witnesses viewing the simultaneous
lineup (and who chose the suspect) should be more
confident in those choices than witnesses who chose
the suspect from a sequential lineup. In contrast, those
who chose the fillers from a simultaneous lineup should
be less confident than those who chose fillers from a
sequential lineup. We analyzed the percent ofwitnesses
who expressed high confidence for suspect choices
and witnesses who expressed high confidence for filler
choices. For simultaneous lineups, 69 out of 87 (or
79.3 percent of the) witnesses who chose the suspect
did so with high confidence. For sequential lineups,
118 out of 140 (or 84.3 percent of the) witnesses who
chose the suspect did so with high confidence. Thus,
if anything, contrary to the investigator bias explanation,
witnesses were more likely to be confident in their
suspect choices in sequential/blind lineups than in
simultaneous lineups.
When the filler choices were examined, 66.7 percent
of the filler choices made to simultaneous lineups and
21.5 percent made to sequential lineups were done so
with high confidence. While the Ns are small, the trend
is nonetheless opposite to the investigator influence
explanation for the results. Thus, those who chose a
filler from a simultaneous lineup were more confident
even though their choices should have disagreed with

(Ebbesen/Finklea, continuedonpage 28)

Table 3. Number and Percent of Suspect and Filler Choices as a Function of Racial Similarity of Witness/
Victim and Culprit forAll Lineups Containing Race Information
Rad al
Similarity
Other Race
Same Race
Total

Number of Choices
Suspect

126
303
429

27 IPublic Interest Law Reporter
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Percent of Choices

Fill er

13
is
31

No Choice
127
138
265

Suspect
47.37
66.01

Filler
4.86
3.92
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the influence attempts of the administrator (assuming
they existed).

multiple-suspect lineups.
As can be seen, the increase in suspect choice rates
from sequential to simultaneous lineups was not larger
when witnesses had presumed weaker memories for
other-race suspects (40.8 percent v. 52.9 percent)
than stronger memories for same-race suspects (59.9
percent v. 70.4 percent). In addition, the decrease in
filler choices was not larger for other-race fillers (7.2
percent v. 2.9 percent) than same-race fillers (7.9
percent v. 1.1 percent). In short, these results are
inconsistent with the investigator influence explanation.

iii) Investigator bias and cross-racial
identifications
General consensus among experts is that an ownrace bias exists such that witnesses are more accurate
in their selections from lineups of their own race than
in their selections from lineups containing individuals
of a different race.'" Consistent with this idea, results
from the Illinois Pilot Program" (Table 3) indicate the Addressing critics of the Illinois Pilot Program
probability that witness/victims chose a suspect
Some critics may argue that the results ofthe Illinois
increased when the suspect and witness were of the study are compromised by a confound between lineup
same race compared to when they were of different procedure and blind testing. That is, the sequential
races. However, the filler choice rates were unaffected. lineups were conducted by investigators blind to the
Thus, when witness/victims attempted to identify identity of the suspect in the lineup, whereas the
suspects who were in a different racial group than their investigators administering simultaneous lineups were
own, they were less likely to identify the suspect as not blind to the suspect's identity. These conditions,
the culprit and were no more likely to make a known however, were proposed as a package deal, meaning
error by identifying a filler. Another way to describe that the double-blind sequential lineup represents the
this result is that when confronted with an other-race policy as it would and should be instantiated over the
lineup, suspects were less likely to choose someone traditional lineup. Thus, in evaluating the proposed
as the perpetrator.
policy change, we compared the components of the
Examining the cross-racial data yields findings proposed change with the standing policy. Had the
inconsistent with the notion of stronger investigator bias effects of lineup procedure and blind testing been
in simultaneous lineups. Investigator bias should be evaluated independently, researchers would not be able
predictably stronger when memory for the culprit is to draw conclusions about the suggested policy change
weak. Research on the own-race bias would suggest as a whole. The Illinois Pilot Programl9 was not
that witnesses have weaker memory for culprits of designed to test the varying options of simultaneous/
another race than for culprits of their shared race. It blind, simultaneous/non-blind, sequential/blind and
would be hypothesized then, that effects of investigator sequential/non-blind. These four procedures would
bias would be more sizeable between simultaneous need to be evaluated separately for the most
and sequential lineups given cross-racial identifications comprehensive assessment. The primary conclusion
than would be seen in same-race simultaneous and researchers can make is that the sequential doublesequential identifications. Suspect choice rates in same- blind procedure, as tested in Illinois, is not superior to
and other-race simultaneous lineups were 188/267 traditional simultaneous lineups.
Previous field studies that promote the success of
(70.41 percent) and 74/140 (52.86 percent)
respectively, while filler choice rates were 3/267 (1.12 sequential double-blind lineups, such as that in
percent) and 4/140 (2.86 percent). These rates can Hennepin County, MN,2 0 have not included traditional
be compared to suspect choices in same- and other- simultaneous control groups to fully examine the
race sequential lineups at 115/192 (59.9 percent) and proposed policy change. Regardless, results of the
5 1/125 (40.8 percent) respectively, while filler choice Hennepin County program closely mirror those of the
rates were 15/192 (7.81 percent) and 9/125 (7.2 Illinois Pilot Program 21 with a 54 percent suspect
percent). Data is included from both single and identification rate and eight percent filler choice rate
(Ebbesen/Finklea, continued on page 29)
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for all known single-suspect, double-blind sequential
lineups. Had a control group been included, is it not
possible that they would have also seen a higher rate
of suspect identifications and lower rate offiller choices
in traditional single-suspect, simultaneous lineups? The
error on which researchers have clearly focused is that
of reducing false identifications, while omitting the
consequences of a witness failing to select the suspect.
With respect to any policy, the details must be
clearly articulated. Simply indicating that a sequential
lineup procedure is to be instituted is insufficient. There
are several procedural variations ofa sequential lineup,
which if altered and implemented in different
combinations, may dramatically affect any resulting
eyewitness decision. One such variation is the inclusion
of a stop rule, in which witnesses are told they will not
be allowed to view the remaining alternatives in the
lineup once they have made a positive identification.
If no stop rule is included (following the sequential
lineup procedure of the present study), an interesting
psychological phenomenon arises. Suppose a witness
positively identifies a foil in the lineup before the suspect
is shown. What do witnesses do when they then see
the suspect? Do they raise their decision criterion at
that point? Do they dismiss the suspect's photo
because now that they believe they have completed
the task of making a selection, are no longer paying
careful attention to the lineup? In other words, we
need to determine where witnesses set their decision
criterion for making a selection from the lineup and
whether this decision criterion is set differentially for
simultaneous and sequential lineup procedures.22
These issues beg the question regarding the decision
strategy witnesses use in their selections. One key
variable in this decision process is the witness' strength
of memory for the culprit. Also, a witness' ability to
discriminate between the actual culprit and innocent
foils may depend on: how similar innocent foils appear
to the culprit, how similar the culprit's looks in the
lineup are to his looks at the time of the crime, and
how similar an innocent suspect's looks in the lineup
are to the culprit's looks at the time of the crime. It is
also important to know what witnesses use as their
standard for determining this degree of match. When
witnesses are presented with items is sequence, rather
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than all at once, we raise the distinct possibility that
witnesses will use different decision criterion for
different items as they progress through the sequence.
One of the key problems with the nature of a
sequential protocol containing a stop rule is that it
prevents the witness from being able to choose the
best lineup member when there is more than one that
is above the witness's decision criterion for a good
match. Thus, in low similarity lineups where the witness'
ability to discriminate (between the suspect and foils)
is high, and the witness' criterion for choosing is high,
one would see a small difference in selection choices
using different decision strategies.23 Conversely, in high
similarity lineups, we might expect that one ofthe foils
presented before the suspect might be a "good enough"
match for the witness to pick him. However, were this
foil and the suspect presented side by side, the witness
might choose the suspect because the suspect is an
even better match to the witness' memory than is the
foil. One consequence of this is that more foils will be
chosen when the suspect is placed later in the lineup.

When witness/victims attempted to iden-

tify suspects who were in a different racial group than their own, they were less

likely to identify the suspects as the culprit and were no more likely to make a
known error by identifying a filler. Another way to describe this result is that
when confronted with an other-race
lineup, suspects were less likely to
choose someone as the perpetrator.
All foils that meet or exceed the witness' criterion for
making a positive identification will be chosen before
the witness even gets to see the suspect.
From the Illinois Pilot Program data,24 we were
able to examine differences in the rate of sequential
lineup fillers selected before and after the suspect
appeared in the lineup. Of the 21 sequential lineup foil
choices (compared to a total of six simultaneous lineup
foils chosen), 13 were selected by witnesses before
the witness had the opportunity to view the suspect in
the lineup, while eight were chosen after the suspect
(Ebbesen/Finklea, continuedonpage 30)
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lineup, they may withhold making a selection, believing
there are always more alternatives to be seen. If each
was viewed. Eliminating the pre-suspect foil choices alternative remains in view after it is presented,
in sequential lineups, the difference in filler choice rates witnesses may utilize these as comparisons to the
between the two lineup procedures is virtually current item upon which they are deciding. Another
eliminated. Interestingly, these results suggest that the possibility is to remove each item from view after a
higher rate of foil choices seen in sequential lineups yes/no decision has been made, forcing an absolute
may be driven by pre-suspect fillers that meet or exceed decision for each item. Also, allowing multiple passes
a witness's decision criterion for making a positive through a lineup may lead witnesses to withhold a
identification.
selection until all lineup members have been viewed
and compared to one another.
Future Research
Yes, the specifics of a particular protocol can easily
Evident from the current discussion, more be defined as to which procedure will be utilized.
laboratory and field research is needed to examine the However, research has not yet been conducted to
efficacy of varying methods of conducting eyewitness determine how all procedural variations of sequential
identification lineups. Sequential double-blind lineups lineups interact to produce different results, nor has it
do not appear to yield fewer known errors than been determined how foil choice rates and suspect
traditional simultaneous lineups. No single study can (guilty suspect vs. innocent suspect) choice rates are
yield definitive results or subsequent recommendations affected by these combinations. Further research is
that are to be widely applied.25 These findings should needed regarding the double-blind procedure and its
encourage more law enforcement agencies to conduct effects on accuracy as well. Options to be evaluated
further research to scientifically investigate the costs include witnesses making selections in private, in front
and benefits that would be associated with instituting a of a blind administrator, or on a computer screen. The
given policy change. As seen from the different pattern main argument for a double-blind procedure stems
of findings in Chicago and Evanston compared to those from the presumed possibility of investigators
in Joliet, any policy changes must be evaluated against inadvertently sending signals to witnesses, thus
jurisdictional differences in the outcome and perhaps influencing their selections.26 Perhaps, though, the mere
adjusted accordingly.
presence of an investigator (blind or not) may
Furthermore, procedural variants of sequential differentially affect witness selections. For this reason,
lineups should be clearly defined and examined before the recommended blinding procedure should be
any policy recommendations should be enacted, and evaluated with witnesses making their final selections
the same holds for details of the double-blind without any investigator contact. Alternatively, simply
procedure. In addition to the aforementioned option telling the witnesses that they should not assume that
of including a stop rule, sequential lineups can differ in the investigator knows who the suspect is might be
protocol based on several factors: what witnesses more than sufficient to produce whatever benefits
believe about the size of the lineup, what happens to researchers believe might be achieved with the more
lineup items after they are viewed, how many passes complex double-blind procedure.
When research is proposed to compare polices,
through the lineup a witness is given, and where in the
lineup the suspect is positioned. The specifics of the all recommendations for change should include methods
sequential procedure may play an important role in and measures that will allow one to monitor which
eyewitness accuracy. For example, providing procedure is more successful; before commencing
witnesses with information on the number ofaltematives research, the measures of success should be defined
in the lineup could create pressure for the eyewitness and agreed upon before any policy change is instituted.
to select someone before the end of the lineup is In the present domain, work that uses DNA, for
reached, or it may build expectations toward the end example, to establish the accuracy of suspect choices
of the lineup that the culprit is not present. Conversely, would avoid criticisms about the use of filler choices
if witnesses are not told how many faces are in the
(Ebbesen/Finklea, continued on page 44)
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enforcement purposes independent ofreliability issues.
Chicago, for example, has recently paid $15,000,000
to plaintiffs who proved that police "tipped" lineup
witnesses.' In all likelihood that award will generate a
legion ofsimilar suits-some justified, most unjustified,
but all expensive to defend. "Double-blind"
administration of lineups and arrays can allow the police
effectively to defend themselves against such claims: a
"double-blind" administrator can't tip anyone. Doubleblind techniques will also allow prosecutors to insulate
the investigators from similar defense attacks in criminal
trials.
There is a new zone of cooperation developing,
where mutual education occurs between the street,
the lab and the courtroom. This zone has been
increasingly utilized in the aftermath of the DNA
exoneration cases. Where practitioners have ventured
into this zone, in Boston, New Jersey and Minnesota,
for example, they have found the results to be
rewarding-to mark a place in which to generate
genuine improvements in practice. It presents novel
challenges, but it also promises significant rewards. It
was with those rewards (and those challenges) in mind
that we joined with our colleagues to form the John
Jay Center For Modem Forensic Practice, an effort
to build a model of a neutral, academic venue where
practitioners and scientists can meet to protect the
innocent and catch the guilty-to get, in the words of
Hennepin County District Attorney Amy Klobuchar,
"Stronger cases and more justice."
Still, there isn't much point in involving scientists in
these discussions unless we will allow them to "do
science"-to approach the empirical questions we
have identified with their proven, rigorous procedures.
The Illinois Legislature posed an empirical question,
and it ought have, but did not, receive an empirical
answer derived by accepted scientific practice. We
think that there are ways to apply the "objective
scientific methodologies" that the Illinois Legislature
wanted in the field. All ofus have a lot to learn both
from rigorous field studies and from the complementary
future laboratory studies that must answer questions
that the field studies are structurally unable to approach.
As a next step along the path we have sketched a
proposed protocol for future eyewitness field studies,
which is reproduced below. Like everything else in
31
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this new zone of cooperation our suggestion is up for

discussion.
We believe one particular aspect of the situation
deserves priority treatment-the advent of efficient,
reliable, convenient digital technology. Inevitably this
technology because of its convenience and flexibility
will soon begin to dominate eyewitness investigative
procedures. That looming fact provides a spur to
immediate further field studies, but it can also be a
very significant aid to conducting those field studies.
The capacity of new technologies to capture data and
facilitate a simple, witness-driven identification
encounter with a minimum of disruption in police
operations can help to unravel many of the practical
difficulties that led to the fatally confounded study
recounted in the Mecklenburg Report. The capacity
to simply standing on the far side of a laptop while the
witness makes choices and records his or her level of
confidence can allow the police to accomplish a great
deal in the way of preserving both scientific rigor and
investigative continuity.
One hundred years after Hugo Munsterberg first
upbraided the legal system about its misuse of
eyewitness memory,' we still have a lot to learn from
each other about the resolution of cases that turn on
eyewitness memory. The learning should be around
the conference table with everyone included, not in
the courtroom, or through the press release. Our hope
is that conference tables at academic institutions around
the country may provide the neutral ground where all
parties can engage the science to inform local practice.
One of the things we'd bring to the conference table is
the protocol that follows:

'James Doyle was a panelist for New Policies, New
Practices: Fresh Perspectives on Eyewitness
Identificationon April 21, 2006 at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. He and his co-authors are from
the Center of for Modem Forensic Practice, John Jay
College of Criminal Justice at the City University of New
York.
2 See Report to the Legislature of the State of Illinois: The
Illinois Pilot Program on Sequential Double-Blind
Identification Procedures by Sheri H. Mecklenburg,
Program Director (Mar. 17, 2006) availableat
www.chicagopolice.org.

(Doyle, continued on page 46)
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But experiments showed that some burned things
gained weight, like certain rusting metals and the
theory died when Lavoisier identified oxygen as the
key to combustion. 9
Well into the development ofmodem physics there
was theory of luminous aether, the medium by which
light traveled through the universe. Great scientists
believed in the aether until the beginning of the 2 0 th
century when the special theory ofrelativity eliminated
the need for it. Experiments, like those of MichelsonMorley 20 measuring the speed of light-had early demonstrated its short comings. There are still a few who
believe in the aether.
In the 1960s the Soviets thought they had discovered polywater, a substance which had the consistency of syrup, did not freeze at 0 centigrade or boil
at 100 centigrade. Now we know there is no polywater, the phenomenon was the product of creating
polywater in contaminated glassware.
It is crucial to understand that the process of scientific discovery begins, except for serendipity, with
something unscientific-a hunch, an act of faith. A scientist believes or intuits that X is true and sets out to
prove it. Because of this built in bias, science requires
that experimental proofs be replicated by scientists
not committed to the result. Even when a scientist has
no vested interest in proving a particular proposition,
the scientist always wants to design an experiment
that proves or disproves something. Flawed or ineffective experiments are a waste oftime and a scientist
who does too many ofthem loses reputation and funding. At the very least, experimenters are emotionally
committed to the validity of the experiment they design and to the results it produces. Again, we demand
replication. The scientist's faith (often based on promising preliminary data) is often spectacularly disappointed. Consider hormone replacement therapy,22
the cancer drug Irressa, 23 the pulmonary fibrosis treatment using Interferon gamma-lb 24 and the use of St.
John's Wort to treat depression.25
A simple rule is to treat all initial studies and experiments in any scientific field with caution, to require scrutiny of the experiment's design and implementation and to require that its results be replicated.
There is another, even more profound difficulty

with tests of eyewitness identification procedure. Experiments in the physical sciences tend to yield mvanable results like the exact speed of light. DavissonGermer proved the wave nature of the electron.2 6
Stern-Gerlach proved electron spin into two orientations.27 Shockley, Bardeen and Brattain detected the
invariable characteristics of semiconductor surfaces. 2 8
Experiments in human psychology are not so decisive. Even human physiology is not that clear. A pancreatic cancer diagnosis is widely, and correctly, perceived to be a death sentence, but 5-10% of patients
survive it. 29 Heroin and opium addiction destroys or
damages its users but a few are not harmed.30 Returning to human psychology, I offer the account of the
following two experiments in psychology.
In the 1970s, a psychologist-lawyer prepared eight

The best solution is to prevent [eyewitness] suggestion in the first place and
to reduce the risk of error, even without
suggestion-to do it right ... before the
lawyers get their hands on it. After a
mistaken identification is made because
of a suggestive procedure, it is very hard
to correct.
volunteers and himself to present themselves, unwashed, unshaved and disheveled at psychiatric emergency rooms and say, "I am hearing a voice. It is saying thud." In all other respects they were to answer all
questions truthfully except for their names and occupations. The mental institutions ran the gamut from
well-funded to minimally funded. All who did this were
admitted and kept anywhere from a week to a little
over seven weeks. When David Rosehan published
his results' there was a storm of protest from psychiatrists. The initial admission was, perhaps, understandable because of the heard voice, the appearance
of the person and they fact they picked a psychiatric
emergency room to present themselves.3 2 It was the
diagnoses made days or weeks later when the heard
voices had disappeared and personal hygiene was
restored and these sane people answered questions
honestly that caused so much concern. The protests
(Zagel, continued on page 33)
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trusted and that, once implanted, the memory could
from the psychiatrists about the unfairness of the ex- be auto-enhanced by their own minds. There are open
periment led Rosehan to proclaim that in certain com- questions as to whether implantation can be achieved
ing months he would send in more pseudo-patients to by someone who is not trusted, but in criminal cases
one hospital. The idea was that, with fair warning, the allegation usually is that false memory was implanted
admitting psychiatrists would be able to better recog- by someone trusted, a sympathetic therapist or a nicenize the sane volunteers, at the very least, by discount- guy detective investigating a crime.
But the question here too is what does it prove?
ing the fact that the person self-presented at a mental
institution. After the appointed period the hospital staff When you deal with a witness, how do you know
reported detecting 41 fake patients. Rosenhan then whether the witness is one of the 25 percent or one of
revealed he had sent none. This latter phase of his the 70 percent who resist implantation? So too with
someone who confesses: how do you know whether
experiment may have been the most telling.
But the question is, what does Rosenhan's data the witness is one of those who can be convinced he
prove? It clearly does not prove that most psychiatric or she committed a crime when they did not? There
admissions were erroneous. In Rosenhan's own ac- are clues, indicia to help one decide, but they are rarely
count ofhis incarceration he encountered many deeply conclusive. Even when expert testimony is offered, it
ill patients. It is also true that eventually, all of the insti- is never decisive and, given our current state ofknowledge, cannot be decisive. All that can be said is that
tutions reached the correct result.
Rosenhan did not have to go to court to get one of this person or that is more likely to remember falsely
his volunteers released from long-term commitment. than someone else. Even this is iffy because no has
It did prove that there was a significant risk of error offered a properly tested diagnostic tool that can prebut it provided no particular way to insure that the dict in advance precisely who will be implantable. Preerrors did not occur. Indeed, the only reason we know diction (and some forms ofwhat is called postdiction)
there were errors in nine particular cases is that, be- is a very important element in the validation of scienfore the fact, Rosenhan, the psychologist was able to tific premises.
The same is true of testimony about whether an
establish that his volunteers were clinically sane.
Elizabeth Loftus started with a belief that false eyewitness is mistaken. In my own experience, some
memories can be implanted. In her experiment she clearly mistaken identifications were made under perused twenty-four persons, each of whom was given a fect conditions and some utterly reliable ones were
packet of papers that, in one short paragraph each, made under indefensible conditions.
And this, I think, is the point of the enterprise of
described three true incidents that happened in the
person's childhood. The source of these stories was pilot programs on identification procedures. After sugthe family of the person being tested. To this a false gestion has worked on the minds of those who are
paragraph was added (with the consent of the fam- susceptible, it is too late effectively to detect whether
ily). This false paragraph described the person being this has, in fact, occurred through cross-examination
lost in the mall as a young child. After the packet was of the witness or by opinion evidence about the reliread by the subject, he or she was asked to write ability of the witness. Some false memory and bad
some more details of each incident or to simply say identification cannot be demonstrated to a court or
they didn't remember the incident. Three-quarters of jury. At best, you have the educated guess of an exthe recruits said, correctly, that they didn't remember pert who does not, as yet, have enough science to say
being lost is the mall. Twenty-five percent did remem- that a particular identification is unreliable with the reqber and then added detail to the false lost in the mall uisite degree of scientific certainty. Indeed, the courts
story e.g., being scared, mother scolding, seeing toys, have not found support for the proposition that there
is a generally accepted degree of scientific certainty
etc.33
What Loftus showed was that some people, one- against which to measure expert testimony. This is the
quarter of her subjects, could have a false memory reason that, where expert evidence of this sort is adimplanted in their consciousness by a relative they (Zagel, continued on page 34)
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mitted, it is remitted to the discretion ofthe trial judge,34
which is not the common standard for hearing the testimony about mental disease or defect, medical malpractice or any of the dozens of kinds of expert evidence permitted automatically in our trials.
The best solution is to prevent the suggestion in
the first place and to reduce the risk of error, even
without suggestion-to do it right, as I said, before the
lawyers get their hands on it. After a mistaken identification is made because of a suggestive procedure, it
is very hard to correct. So we must find the best way
to achieve valid identification before it is made.
Where do we go from here?
So what did the pilot program study show? Mainly
it showed that the particular sequential double-blind
method of identification was not better (and possibly
worse) than a simultaneous method of presentation.
As a collateral matter, there were lower rates of false
identifications than some predicted, nothing to confirm the presence of police suggestion deliberate or
otherwise, or to support age and racial factors in identification. Identification of strangers was less reliable
than non-strangers, an expected result, and the
weapon focus theory was not supported.
Does this end the debate? No. One study, maybe
even a dozen studies are not enough. There is more
than one alternative to the ones tested here. It may
well be that even this study replicated exactly might
yield different results. Science moves in fits and starts.
The scientists who predicted different results may, with
dispassion, criticize the methods and designs of the
study, which is what they ought to be doing.
What I urge here is dispassion, a lot less passion.
It does society, whose stake in this is very large, no
good ifany expert in this field becomes anotherNikolai
Fedyakin, the discoverer of polywater who fought
tooth and nail to discredit every experiment that
trashed the existence ofpolywater." This just served
to confirm the view that the West had of Soviet science from the days of Stalin and Lysenko. Moreover,
I think, in the end, it will have to be the work of people
new to the field who experiment and confirm whatever results we find. The current experts in the field
may be viewed as having too great an interest in proving
Summer 2006
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they were right. It is not an insult to Einstein to say that
his theories were not fully accepted until someone other
than he made the observations that validated his predictions. This may or may not be unfair, but it is the
way of our world now.
I urge less passion for the lawyers as well. I have
heard that prosecutors are happy with the results of
this study and defenders are not. Why? Because they
are in the adversarial mind set which is not the way to
view these results and future results. What we ought to
be after is accuracy of identification and what should
please us is improvement in accuracy not an improvement in the conviction or acquittal rate.
I have not heard how the police perceive these results. I am sure there are some detectives who regard
this as pointless academic meddling, but I believe that
most will not, in the end, think so. It is useful to remember this about our current system: the role of the
judge orjury is to decide the case on the basis of the
evidence presented, the prosecutor who believes in
good faith that he has good evidence is to pursue an
accused and the defender is to make the best possible
case for the accused. It is true too that once the police
have concluded their investigation they are perceived,
and sometimes rightly so, as adjuncts of the prosecution. But before the lawyers get their hands on the case,
the police properly view their role as detecting what
crime has been committed and who, in fact, committed it and who, in fact, did not. The investigative stage
may be controlled by legal rules but it is not part of the
adversary system and the allegiance of the police is to
the truth. They have no mandated role to play for the
prosecution or the defense. Now I do not dispute that
pure adherence to appointed social roles is not invariable. Scientists take sides without adequate proof.
Prosecutors will turn their backs on good evidence
when they have a hunch that the defendant is innocent,
and I have seen defense counsel, whom has covertly
aided the prosecution by their tactical decisions because they were repelled by the client and his crime.
There are police who will go too far in order to close a
case. Of the unreliable people I have seen in my life, I
have not found that police investigator/detective ranks
have a higher proportion of them than does the bar or
the cadre of expert witnesses. At least the investigator's
income is not influenced by success in litigation, and
(Zagel, continued on page 35)
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the investigator's duty is not to present the best case,
it is to present the truth. We are all people and influenced by ambition and personal morals deemed more
binding than society's rules. But what struck me most
when I went from being a prosecutor to being a police chiefwas the openness ofmost investigators about
where the evidence, not their preconceptions, led
them. They speak a different language. Prosecutors
mostly talked over whether they had enough evidence
to convict the accused and defenders engage in the
same conversation from the opposite perspective.
When the evidence was not strong, police tended to
discuss whether this or that suspect or none of them
was the right one for the crime. It is the reason why
Jim Doyle discovered, and noted in True Witness, 6
that it was the police who were most interested in the
experts' efforts to improve identification.
Most important here is not whether the pilot program showed that one method is no better than another. That it was done at all is the news of the day
and if this method did not make a difference perhaps
another will. If we keep our eye on a revived sense
of the importance of truth, we will find better ways.
You can laugh at the early days when some poor
graduate student ran into a class room carrying a fake
gun and pretending to steal the professor's wallet just
so the professor could require all the undergraduates
to report what they had seen and view a lineup.
But the efforts improve over time and some of it is
due to the feedback that comes from seeing predictions fail and reconsidering the evidence for the predictions. And because we see there may be better
ways to send more of the right people to prison and
none of the wrong ones, the increased attention to
truth in criminal cases will bring the support we need
for this new attempt to climb a very old mountain.

The U.S. National Institute ofJustice Technical Working
Group for Eyewitness Evidence recommended use of
a culprit description strategy.28 In contrast, the English
code of practice requires a suspect resemblance
strategy.29
When the police in England construct a video lineup
they choose foils on the basis of their resemblance to
the suspect. The problem with this strategy is that high
similarity between the suspect and foils makes
identification of an offender present in the lineup very
difficult even for a witness who has a good memory of
the offender. The logical extreme is a lineup of clones,
which obviously would render the process ineffective.
The logic behind a culprit description strategy is that
the witness may remember the description they gave to
the police and may look for somebody who matches
that description. If all foils have been selected to match
that description, there will no bias against the suspect.
It does not make a lineup unfair if the members differ in
characteristics not mentioned in the description. In fact,
this is a useful characteristic of a lineup. A witness seeing an offender on a lineup may recognise a feature
they did not describe. However, this is no more likely
to occur for an innocent suspect than for any of the
foils.3 0
The effectiveness of a culprit description strategy
and a suspect resemblance strategy was compared in
an experiment using a staged live incident similar to that
described above. All witnesses provided a written description of the offender immediately after an unexpected staged incident. The participants individually
attended a video identification approximately a week
after the incident. All video identifications were conducted in accordance with the current code of practice, except that the administrator was always blind to
the identity of the suspect and did not know if the culprit was in the lineup. The lineups were constructed
from the VIPER national database of foils. Half of the
lineups were constructed using the suspect resemblance
strategy required by the code of practice. The remaining lineups were constructed by selecting foils who
matched the description given by the individual witness. Within that constraint, foils were selected who
differed as much as possible, although foils did not dif-

IJames B. Zagel, United States District Judge (1987present); Former Director, Illinois State Police (1980-1987);
B.A., M.A., University of Chicago 1962; J.D. Harvard Law
School 1965. Judge Zagel was the keynote speaker at the
New Policies, New Practices:Fresh Perspectives on
Eyewitness Identification at Loyola University Chicago
School of Law on April 21, 2006.
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